At the first meeting of the Executive Committee on Tuesday, October 16, the majority of the president`s civilian and military advisers advocated an immediate airstrike on Cuba with the aim of destroying the missile sites. However, a noisy minority has proposed other alternatives. A second reason the Soviet missiles were moved to Cuba was that Khrushchev wanted to put West Berlin, which was controlled by the Americans, British and French from communist East Germany, into Soviet orbit. The East Germans and Soviets saw Western control of part of Berlin as a serious threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if the U.S. did nothing about missile deployments in Cuba, it could use the West in Berlin with these missiles as a deterrent against Western countermeasures in Berlin. If the U.S. tried to negotiate with the Soviets after learning of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand the missile trade for West Berlin. Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, trade would be a victory for Khrushchev, as Kennedy acknowledged: “The advantage is that, from Khrushchev`s point of view, he has a great opportunity, but there are some rewards.”  Now we started from the assumption that in the event of an invasion of Cuba, a nuclear war would break out. We were sure of that.
we would be forced to pay the price of our disappearance. Would I have been willing to use nuclear weapons? Yes, I would have accepted the use of nuclear weapons. This decision was intended to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. U.S. officials ensured that the Soviets began communications ordering U.S. nuclear forces to be on high alert. At the United Nations, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson spoke with Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin about the crisis. “Well, let me tell you something, Mr. Ambassador – we have the evidence [for the missile sites],” Stevenson said.
“We have it, and it`s clear and it`s undeniable. And let me say something else – these weapons must be removed from Cuba” (Hanhimaki and Westad 485). The president also went on national television that evening to inform the public about developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and implement a “quarantine” and the possible global consequences of a further escalation of the crisis. The tone of the president`s remarks was harsh and the message unequivocal, recalling the Monroe Doctrine: “It will be the policy of this nation to consider any nuclear missile fired from Cuba against a nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union against the United States that requires a full retaliatory response to the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status for DEFCON 3 when U.S. naval forces began implementing quarantine and plans for a military strike in Cuba were accelerated. When the reconnaissance missions were approved again on October 9, bad weather prevented the planes from flying. The United States received the 14th for the first time. In October, U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles when a U-2 flight led by Major Richard Heyser took 928 images on a route chosen by DIA analysts and took photos of an SS-4 construction site in San Cristóbal, in the province of Pinar del Río (now in the province of Artemissa) in western Cuba.  -24 warheads for R-14 missiles; -44 warheads for the FKR missiles that loaded the Aleksandrovsk transport in the port of Severomorsk.
The Executive Committee then discussed the implications for the strategic balance of political and military forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously change the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An additional 40, he argued, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The United States already had about 5,000 strategic warheads,:261, but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that the Soviets, with 340 members, would not significantly alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he repeated that “it made no difference. The military balance has not been altered. I didn`t believe it then, and I don`t believe it today.  With major congressional elections scheduled for November, the crisis has become entangled in American politics. On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) warned the Senate that the Soviet Union would “in all likelihood” establish a missile base in Cuba. Kennedy by CIA-trained Forces of Cuban Exiles.
After that, former President Dwight Eisenhower told Kennedy that “the failure of the Bay of Pigs will encourage the Soviets to do something they would not do otherwise.” :10 The timid invasion left Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, “too young, intellectual, not well prepared for decision-making in crisis situations.” too smart and too weak.”  U.S. covert operations against Cuba continued in 1961 with the failure of Operation Mongoose.  Kornienko: Well, how did we think you would react to the deployment? I think Khrushchev was just hoping that Kennedy would “swallow missiles,” so to speak. Khrushchev believed that Kennedy was a very intelligent man. Therefore, Kennedy would likely accept Soviet missiles in Cuba, not out of weakness, but out of caution. At least four emergency strikes were armed from Florida in 1963 and 1964 and launched against Cuban airfields and suspected missile sites, although all were diverted to the Pinecastle Range complex after the planes passed through Andros Island.  Critics, including Seymour Melman and Seymour Hersh have suggested that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged the use of military means by the United States, as was the case during the subsequent Vietnam War. No subsequent U.S. decision in the Cuban Missile Crisis contributed as much to the prevention of war as President Kennedy`s first three decisions.
They embossed and limited U.S. actions in the days that followed, so there would be no immediate, instinctive, and emotional response to the news of the deployment. The president`s first decisions guaranteed this. On the 25th. October at 1:45 a.m. EDT.m, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev`s telegram by stating that the United States was forced to act after being repeatedly assured that no offensive missiles would be placed in Cuba, and when the assurances turned out to be false, the deployment demanded “the answers I announced. I hope that your government will take the necessary steps to allow a restoration of the previous situation. We had to send a U-2 to get reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were ready for use. We thought that if the U-2 was shot down – the Cubans didn`t have the capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did – we thought that if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile unit, and that this would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict.
And that`s why, before sending the U-2, we agreed that if it was shot down, we wouldn`t hit each other, we would just attack. He was shot dead on Friday. Luckily, we changed our minds, we thought, “Well, it could have been an accident, we`re not going to attack.” Later, we learned that Khrushchev had argued in the same way as we did: we would send the U-2 if it was shot down, he argued that we would believe it was a deliberate escalation. And that is why he ordered Plipyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to order all his batteries not to shoot down U-2. [Note 1]  The Cuban Missile Crisis may have begun in April 1961 in the Bay of Pigs, because even after this “perfect failure,” Washington continued to secretly plan and conduct overt military exercises for military intervention in Cuba. On the 30th. In November 1961, President Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose, a major new program of covert action against the Castro regime; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared several plans for operations in Cuba until the invasion. .